The Epicurean Dealmaker
Finance
has always been complex. More precisely it has always been opaque, and
complexity is a means of rationalizing opacity in societies that pretend
to transparency. Opacity is absolutely essential to modern finance. It
is a feature not a bug until we radically change the way we mobilize
economic risk-bearing. The core purpose of status quo finance is to coax
people into accepting risks that they would not, if fully informed,
consent to bear.
This is the nature of an Iv-B economy where Iv agents use deception to lure in B clients and each other. it causes false optimism and growth towards a ceiling and eventual collapse. Weak I-O regulatiors and markets prevent transparency moderating this momentum and deception.
Financial systems help us overcome a collective action problem. In a
world of investment projects whose costs and risks are perfectly
transparent, most individuals would be frightened.
This causes V-Bi stagnation, Iv-B bluffing about results often leads to more innovation.
Real enterprise is
very risky. Further, the probability of success of any one project
depends upon the degree to which other projects are simultaneously
underway.
Like growing seedlings where only one might grow into a tree and overshadow the others.
A budding industrialist in an agrarian society who tries to
build a car factory will fail. Her peers will be unable to supply the
inputs required to make the thing work. If by some miracle she gets the
factory up and running, her customer-base of low capital, low
productivity farm workers will be unable to afford the end product.
Successful real investment does not occur via isolated projects, but in
waves, forward thrusts by cohorts of optimists, most of whom crash and
burn, some of whom do great things for the world and make their
investors wealthy.
These are Iv-B waves of momentum that crash and burn when they hit the ceiling like ocean waves hitting a beach.
But the winners depend upon the existence of the
losers: In a world where there was no Qwest overbuilding fiber, there
would have been no Amazon losing a nickel on every sale and making it up
on volume. Even in the context of an astonishing tech boom, Amazon was a
pretty iffy investment in 1997. It would have been an absurd investment
without the growth and momentum generated by thousands of peers, some
of whom fared well but most of whom did not.
The losers become like humus for the newer Iv-B seedlings.
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